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Abstract 
This study uses an endogenous switching regression model to measure the effect of credit 
on output under assumptions of selectivity bias. The model allows for the separation of the true 
credit effect from the effect of observable and unobservable characteristics of borrowers and 
nonborrowers. Thus, it becomes possible to clearly identify the different components that undelie 
the observed performance gap between borrowers and nonborrowers. Using data from a survey 
of rural nonfarm enterprises in the Visayas Region in the Philippines, the econometric estimates 
provide strong empirical support for the positive relationship between credit and output. 
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1. Introduction 
Rural nonfarm enterprises have sparked interest among development practitioners because 
of their potential to generate income and employment in rural areas [Ho (1980), Binswanger 
(1983), Haggblade et al. (1986), Liedholm and Mead (1987), Vijverberg (1988), Liedholm 
(1990), Ranis and Stewart (1990), Duggleby et al. (1992), and Ahmed and Randolph]. Programs 
to facilitate the development of these enterprises have subsequently emerged, often designed 
within the supply leading financial policy framework [see Liedholm and Mead (1987), Boomgard 
(1989), Levitsky (1989), Otero (1989), and Webster (1989), among others]. In this approach, the 
main objective is to assist entrepreneurs to obtain financial services more easily and quickly than 
would occur if fmancial markets were left to respond to market demand. This approach is 
anchored in the notion that credit is panacea to the difficulties experienced by these enterprises. 
Empirical studies have shown that financial constraints in the form of working capital shortages 
and/or cash shortages are often the major problems perceived by entrepreneurs as hindering the 
growth of their enterprises [see Liedholm (1989) for a review of these studies]. Thus, by relaxing 
the fmancial constraints through the provision of additional funds from credit, it is believed that 
productivity gains will be realized. 
The potential gain in productivity resulting from additional funds, however, may or may 
not be realized depending on the degree to which financial constraints affect the economic beha-
vior of the enterprise. Providing credit to an enterprise facing binding fmancial constraints may 
result in positive marginal effects on output, but may have no marginal effect on the output of an 
enterprise facing nonbinding fmancial constraints. In addition, the marginal effect of credit may 
differ among those enterprises that actually use it. Although credit can increase output, there are 
certain inherent borrower characteristics that determine the degree to which credit is or is not used 
and its resulting marginal effects on output [Adams (1988)]. Thus, any productivity differential 
observed among borrowers and nonborrowers may reflect pre-existing differences in productivity 
as well as the effect of relaxed fmancial constraints. 
Determining the actual effect on output of additional funds obtained from loans is a tricky 
matter because of the identification problem or the difficulty of clearly attributing the effect from 
a specific factor because of the "noise" caused by the other effects. This identification problem 
subsequently results in imprecise measurement and estimation of credit effects, thereby contribut-
ing to a poor understanding of the impact of improved access to credit [Carter (1989)]. David and 
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Meyer (1980) pointed out that fungibility contributes to the difficulty in obtaining a precise 
measure of the "additionality" effect of credit. Empirical problems arising from the likely hetero-
geneity of borrowers and nonborrowers can also affect the estimation of the true credit effects. 
While descriptive statistics often show differences in the average performance of borrowers and 
nonborrowers, it does not measure the proportion of the difference attributable to borrowing 
alone. This is because the difference measured is distorted by the effects arising from the likely 
heterogeneity of the sample; i.e., borrowers have different inherent characteristics compared with 
nonborrowers, as a result of an endogenous sorting process where credit status is an outcome of 
the individual's decision to apply for a loan and the lender's decision to provide it. As Adams 
(1988) pointed out, it is likely that borrowers would be more productive than nonborrowers even 
without credit because of better inherent characteristics. It is important, therefore, to isolate the 
effect of credit on productivity from the effect of inherent characteristics of the enterprise and of 
the entrepreneur. By doing so, a more accurate and realistic assessment can be made of the ef-
fectiveness of using credit as a means to promote the development of rural nonfarm enterprises. 
This paper addresses the issue of estimating the true effects of credit on the productivity 
of rural nonfarm enterprises. An econometric model that takes into account the non-random 
sorting of the sample between borrowers and nonborrowers is used to segregate the impact of 
credit from the impact of latent and observable characteristics of borrowers and nonborrowers. 
This approach is an improvement over the conventional use of OLS in estimating output supply 
equations and deriving credit effects from the estimated coefficients. By correcting for the 
selection bias, this econometric approach yields consistent and unbiased estimates of the 
parameters [Maddala and Nelson (1975)]. 
2. A descriptive profile of borrowers and nonborrowers 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of borrowers and nonborrowers among the rural 
nonfarm enterprises surveyed in the Visayas region of the Philippines as part of the Dynamics of 
Rural Development Project of the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) funded by 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). A discussion of the sampling 
design is presented in the Appendix. The results indicate positive and statistically significant dif-
ferentials in favor of borrowers in terms of gross sales, net income, total assets, and number of 
workers. 1 
The descriptive statistics similar to those often presented in surveys of enterprises in 
developing countries, in that they imply that borrowers are more productive than nonborrowers. 
For example, borrowers on the average have larger gross sales and net income than 
nonborrowers. Borrowers also appear to be larger in terms of number of workers and they 
reinvest more income than nonborrowers do. There is a serious weakness in accepting the results 
1 A detailed discussion of the descriptive profile of borrowers and nonborrowers among the 
sample enterprises is presented in Lapar (1994). 
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of these descriptive statistics at face value, however, because they attribute differences in 
productivity and resource use between borrowers and nonborrowers solely to the use of credit. 
While it may be true that credit is associated with productivity gains, it is not clear whether it 
actually causes them or merely reflects pre-existing differences between borrowers and 
nonborrowers. For example, better skills and managerial abilities of the entrepreneur should be 
reflected in a positive effect on output. But since these qualities are not directly observable, their 
effects may be confounded by the effects of other observable factors like borrowing. It is the 
presence of latent factors that are likely to be correlated with credit that makes the unconditional 
descriptive statistical analysis a biased measure of the variation in productivity between borrowers 
and nonborrowers. 
3. A selectivity model 
A selectivity model is used in order to disentangle the effects of credit from the effects of 
observable and latent attributes of borrowers vis-a-vis nonborrowers. The model developed 
follows those of Carter (1989), Feder et al. (1990), and Sial and Carter (1992). Let Q(.) be the 
anticipated output supply, defmed as a function of loan size "L" and other characteristics. Output 
for an enterprise "i" is produced according to one of two production regimes: 
(1) 
Q1c = a·~~ + Pc'zl + (v1 c + E1 c)ifaborrower; 
Qm = Pn'zl + ( vm + Em) otherwise. 
In this switching regressions specification, the base regime, denoted with a subscript "n", is the 
case that represents nonborrowers. The other regime, denoted with a subscript "c", represents 
borrowers. The right hand side variables are partitioned into the observable and unobservable 
variables, e1 and Z1 , respectively. The vector el is a quadratic expansion of the loan amount ~. 
The impact of loans on output supply is given by a'Q1 , a nonlinear function of L1 which allows 
for diminishing returns to loans. On the other hand, the vector Z1 includes variables that account 
for market opportunities, fixed factors of capital and labor, and entrepreneurial characteristics, 
among others. The parameters PJ (j =n,c) give the impact of the observable variables on output 
supply and are allowed to vary between the two regimes in (1) to allow for the possibility that 
relaxing fmancial constraints may permit an entrepreneur to earn larger returns from a given 
market opportunity and level of fixed factors. 
The latent variables are divided into those that are known (the v/s) and those that are 
unknown (the e/s). The v/s give the effect of inherent enterprise and entrepreneur characteristics 
such as managerial and entrepreneurial skills on output supply. While these are known to the 
individual, they are not observed by the econometrician. It can be assumed that this latent 
variable is scaled such that E(v1) =0 for an individual selected at random from the overall rural 
nonfarm enterprise population of borrowers and nonborrowers. The v/s are allowed to differ 
across the two production regimes in the full switching regression specification to accommodate 
the productivity effect of differences in the attributes between borrowers and nonborrowers (e.g., 
a relaxed financial constraint may result in larger returns to latent managerial ability). The E1'S 
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are the conventional, unanticipated random supply shocks unknown to the entrepreneur at the time 
production decisions are made and it is assumed that E(E1)=0. 
Estimation of the parameters in the output supply equation (1) is complicated by the fact 
that credit status is endogenously determined in a way that may be systematically related to the 
expected credit effects (Carter 1989). Under this endogenous sorting, it is likely that borrowers 
have systematically different attributes from nonborrowers. Thus, while E(v)=O for an individual 
randomly chosen from the overall population, it seems likely that the latent variable V1 has a 
nonzero conditional expectation for the two non-randomly sorted subsamples of borrowers and 
nonborrowers. There is a need, therefore, to specify the non-random process that sorts 
individuals into borrowers and nonborrowers in order to obtain consistent estimates of the 
production regime parameters and to identify the effect of credit on output. 
The process that sorts borrowers and nonborrowers into the two regimes involves the 
decision of the individual to apply for a loan and the decision of the lender to make a loan. This 
implies two selection criterion functions, where, say, I/ refers to the individual's decision whether 
or not to apply for a loan, and I2* refers to the lender's decision whether or not to grant the loan.2 
The analysis of models with more than one selection criterion function depends critically on 
whether the two decisions are independent or correlated; that is, whether or not the covariances 
of the error terms in the two criterion functions are zero. If the covariance is zero, implying 
independence, then the estimation of the parameters of the model is feasible and tractable. 
However, if the covariance is not zero, implying non-independence, which in the case of borrower 
and lender decisions is a realistic assumption, then estimation becomes more difficult because the 
expressions of the expected values of the error terms "get very messy" (Maddala 1983, p.282). 
In this case, the bivariate probit method is used to estimate the criterion functions (Fishe et al. 
1981). This approach is deemed not feasible in this study, however, because of the lack of 
2 Note that the individual's decision whether or not to apply for a loan and the lender's decision 
whether or not to grant a loan can be modelled as either as a sequential or a joint-decision process. 
In both cases, there should ideally be two criterion functions to represent the individual's and the 
lender's separate decision choice, where the individual's criterion function can represent the 
demand for credit and the lender's criterion function, the supply of credit. However, if marginal 
and conditional inferences are needed to be made in the analysis, then the sequential-decision 
selection approach to model the criterion function may not be the appropriate approach (see 
Maddala 1983). The resulting truncation in the sample has been shown to affect the quality of the 
estimates of the parameters of the selectivity criterion even if it is still possible to correct for the 
selectivity bias in the OLS estimates of the parameters of the second stage equation (Maddala 
1983, p.267). An alternative way of modelling the criterion function is to consider the individual's 
decision whether to apply for a loan and the lender's decision whether or not to grant a loan as 
a joint decision. This approach can be justified by the fact that what we actually observe is 
whether an individual is a borrower or a nonborrower and we do not observe the individual 
decisions of the individual borrower and the lender. 
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information about the decision-making process of the lenders, i.e., there is no information in the 
data set pertaining to the factors used by lenders in deciding whether or not to grant a loan. Thus, 
a second best approach is used wherein a single probit equation which is an approximation of the 
two-probit equations. 3 Let this single pro bit equation be termed the credit status equation which 
includes factors affecting the individual's decision to apply for a loan and the lender's decision 
to grant a loan. In the absence of information from the lender's side, factors from the borrowers' 
side are used to infer lender behavior. 
Credit status can be represented by the binary variable D1 which equals one if a borrower 
and zero otherwise. D1 can be modelled as a result of a latent credit access variable, ~ which 
is scaled such that an individual becomes a borrower when $£1 > 0. A reduced form specification 
for latent credit access can be written as: 
(2) $£1 = y'x, + '111 , 
where X1 is a vector of variables that determine credit access, y is a vector of parameters, and 'l'} 1 
is an error component reflecting random and latent factors that influence credit access. Thus, the 
sample separation process can be written as: 
(3) 1 if $£1 = y'x, + 11, > 0, or '111 > -y'x1 
0 otherwise. 
The expected output supply conditional on the endogenous sample separation process and 
observable characteristics can then be written as: 
(4a) E(Q,c!D,=l) = Pc'z, + ct'~1 + E(v,ciD,=l) 
(4b) E(QmiD1=0) = Pn'Z1 + E(vmiD1=0) 
where conditioning on the observable variables z has been suppressed. The conditional 
expectations on the right hand side can be rewritten as: 
(Sa) E(vlc!D1=1) = E(v1cl'l'l~ > -y'x) 
(Sb) E(vmiD1=0) = E(vml'l'l 1 < -y'x) 
3 It is recognized that the second best approach usually will not result in estimated parameters that 
are comparable with those obtained using the ideal model. In this case, the use of the single 
probit equation to approximate the two-probit criterion functions may result in biased estimates 
of the parameters of the criterion function. 
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Note that from (5) the problem of intrinsic productivity differences between borrowers and 
nonborrowers can be clearly seen. If latent productivity attributes are systematically related to 
credit status, then the conditional expectations in (5) will not be zero. For example, individuals 
with better entrepreneurial skills are likely to realize larger output supply (via V1J as well as have 
higher probability of obtaining credit under non-random sorting (via TJ,), implying that 
E(v,c I D1 = 1) > 0 in the borrower subsample. Under these circumstances, estimating the output 
supply equation using OLS4 will not yield consistent estimates of the structural parameters because 
of the correlation between latent managerial skill and the observed loan amount. In this case, the 
direct output effect of latent managerial skill is attributed to the observed loan amount with which 
it is correlated. 
The problem of non-random sorting that underlies the inconsistency of OLS fortunately 
suggests a resolution of the estimation problem. The problematic correlation between the V1 and 
TJ 1 indicates that the latter in fact provides information on the latent variable v. Thus, the 
parameters of interest can be consistently estimated by using this information to control for the 
latent characteristics v,c and vm. By assuming that the error vector (1'), "tc, ~n) is distributed 
multivariate normal with zero expectations and positive definite covariance matrix [Maddala 
(1983)], a full endogenous switching regressions system can be written as: 
(6a) 1 if TJ 1 > -y'x1 
0 otherwise. 
where Pc=Cov(TJ, ,V1c)/Var(TJ1 ) and g =Cov(TI ,lfi )/Var(TI ) are the population regression 
coefficients relating the V1c and V10 , respectively; A1c=4>(C)/~(C1) and A1°=Q>(C1)/1-ci>(C,) are the 
estimates of T),given borrower type and C1=y'x1Nar(TJ1 ) ; 4>(.) and ci>(.) are the standard normal 
density and cumulative distribution functions, respectively. 
The parameters of this system can be estimated using maximum likelihood methods. 
Heckman proposes a two-stage procedure for estimating consistent but less efficient parameters 
of (6) [Maddala (1983)]. The procedure is as follows. Obtain estimates of y/Var(T), ). Using 
4 However, even if OLS cannot separately identify the effect of credit from the effect of latent 
attributes, it does give the best linear estimate of the (gross) output supply gap between non-
randomly sorted borrowers and non-borrowers (Sial and Carter 1992). This gross output supply 
gap can be written as: 
E(Q,clv1J- E(QmlvJ = o'z1 + «'~, + [E(v!CID 1=1)- E(vmiD~=O)], where o= (~c-
f3J. 
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these, get the estimated values of cf>(C) and 4>(<:;) and use these to construe~ A. c a:Q.d ;._n . 
Consistent estimates of ~ may be obtained through separate OLS regressions of the two 
conditional output supply functions in (6). Alternatively, it is possible and often desirable to 
estimate (6) using all the observations in Q1 [Maddala (1983)]. Note that 
(7) E(Q) = E(Q1ciD~=1)Prob(D1 =1) + E(Qm!D1 =0)Prob(D1=0), so that 
(8) E(Q) = ~c'Z1 + o'[<l?(C)zJ + cx'[<l?(C1)QJ + (Pc- Pn)<f>(C1). 
This specification in (8) allows for the estimation of direct credit effect parameters, the ex, and the 
indirect credit effect parameters, the o and the (pc- pJ [Sial and Carter (1992)]. While the direct 
effect parameters give the increase in output supply due to the use of loans, the indirect credit 
effects represent the additional returns to observable and unobservable endowments when credit 
is used. If the loans do not enhance the returns to other factors, i.e., both o and (pc- pJ are equal 
to zero, then (8) reduces to the following equation: 
Equation (9) is a restricted form of (8) wherein credit has direct effects only; however, these 
effects still cannot be estimated using OLS given the non-random sorting of individuals between 
borrowers and nonborrowers. 
4. Credit effect measures 
The credit effect measures to be used in determining the impact of credit on output are 
defmed as follows [Carter (1989), Sial and Carter (1992)]: 
(lOa) Random credit effect: 
(lOb) Counterfactual credit effect for borrowers 
E(Q1ciD1=1)- E(Qm!D~=l) = [Pc'zl + cx'Q1 + E(vlciD~=l)]- [Pn'Zl + E(vm!D,=l)] 
= o'z, + cx'QI + (Pc- Pn) 'Ale. 
(lOc) Counterfactual credit effect for nonborrowers: 
E(Q1ciD~=O)- E(QmiD~=O) = [Pc'Z1 + cx'el + E(vlciD,=O)]- [Pn'z, + E(vmiD~=O)] 
= o'zl + a.'el + (Pc- Pn) ;._1n· 
The random credit effect measure determines the effect of credit were it given to an individual 
selected at random from the overall population of rural nonfarm entrepreneurs. The expected 
value of latent attributes for such an individual is zero. On the other hand, the measure of 
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counterfactual credit effect compares the output anticipated by an individual under the actual credit 
status with the output level that would be anticipated by that same individual in the counterfactual 
state [Tunali (1985), Carter (1989), Sial and Carter (1992)]. Note that both counterfactual 
measures are in fact the sum of the random credit effect and the gains or losses the individual 
would anticipate given the latent characteristics. While the random credit effect can show the 
effect of credit on the output supply of an individual with the same observable attributes as the 
other individuals in the sample, the counterfactual credit effect can indicate the impact of credit 
on the output of individuals who choose to be or not to be borrowers. Both the random and 
counterfactual effects are measures of total effect of credit on output supply. In order to 
determine the marginal effect of additional credit on output supply, we use the marginal credit 
effect which is defined as the partial derivative of output with respect to loan amount. This 
measure is shown as: 
5. Empirical estimation of the model 
The empirical estimation of the econometric model requires the specification of the 
criterion function which sorts the sample into the two regimes, namely, borrowers and 
nonborrowers, as well as the output supply equation. These two equations constitute the 
endogenous switching regression model. Following Heckman's two-stage procedure discussed 
above, the first stage equation or the criterion function is estimated using the univariate probit 
procedure and the second stage equation is estimated using the ordinary least squares procedure. 
The flrst stage equation, labelled as the credit status equation, is a function of the entrepreneur's 
decision to apply for a loan and the lender's decision to grant a loan. Hence, this equation ideally 
is specified as a function of variables that indicate demand for and supply of credit to reflect the 
individual's decision whether or not to apply for a loan and the lender's decision whether or not 
to grant a loan. As the criterion function in the model, this equation sorts the sample into the two 
regimes of borrower and nonborrower. In this sense, this function includes the variables that 
determine or affect credit access. 
For the empirical estimation of this equation, the independent variables included those 
factors that explain the borrower's demand for and supply of credit (see Table 2). These variables 
include the value of fixed assets, total assets, and financial assets owned by the entrepreneur, 
previous year's income, number of years the enterprise has been operating, age of the 
owner/operator, number of years spent in school (as a measure of educational attainment), and 
a dummy variable for bank-client relationship, i.e., existence of a bank account, which equals one 
if the operator has a bank account and zero otherwise. Dummies for gender, type of activity 
undertaken and for the province where the enterprise operates are also included. These variables 
were chosen from the literature on credit access [see Feder et al. (1990), Kochar (1992), and Sial 
and Carter (1992), for example]. 
9 
The second stage equation is the output supply equation. This equation is specified as a 
function of fixed and non-fixed inputs and other observable characteristics. The variables included 
in the output supply equation are the number of family and hired workers, value of total assets, 
cost per hour of labor, number of years the enterprise has been operating (or firm age), average 
number of hours the enterprise operates, working capital, the amount of loan received, and 
amount of loan received squared. These variables were chosen from the empirical literature such 
as the works of Carter (1989), Feder et al. (1992), and Sial and Carter (1992). A quadratic form 
of the loan amount variable is included to account for the direct effect of credit on output. The 
loan variable measures the total value of loans received by borrowers during the period 1989-
1991, i.e., the preceding two years and the current year of operation covered in the study. 
Dummy variables for province and type of activity are also included in the output supply equation 
to account for market and sector effects on output. For the actual estimation of the output supply 
equation, the dummy variables for Negros Occidental and services were dropped. The dependent 
variable is the value of output. 
The data set used in estimating the model was obtained from a survey of rural nonfarm 
enterprises in the Visayas region of the Philippines. The survey area included the provinces of 
Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Cebu, and Bohol where a higher degree of economic activity were ob-
served relative to the other parts of the Visayas region. With Visayas considered one of the 
growth centers in the Philippine government's latest Medium-Term Development Plan, it can be 
a potential hub of economic activity in the coming years implying better economic opportunities 
for rural nonfarm enterprises in the region. There were 400 sample enterprises in the data set, of 
which 125 were engaged in manufacturing, 164 in trading, and 111 in services (see Appendix for 
the description of the sampling design). 
5.1. Results of the probit equation estimation 
Results of the estimated probit equation for credit status show that of the independent vari-
ables included, only total assets, financial assets, no. of years in school, and the dummy variables 
for gender, Iloilo (provincial dummy), and trading (activity dummy) are statistically significant 
(see Table 3). The subsequent discussion focuses on these variables. 
The positive coefficient for financial assets indicates that the more fmancial assets (in the 
form of savings and checking account with a financial institution) the entrepreneur has, the more 
likely he or she will be to obtain a loan because such fmancial assets act as a proxy for the 
collateral substitute of an established bank-client relationship. This result is consistent with credit 
rationing theory. The positive effect of this bank-client relationship on securing credit was also 
validated in a separate study on credit rationing in the Philippines (Lapar 1988). It was shown 
that borrowers who have a longer relationship with a bank, either through maintaining an account 
in a bank or having good credit records, are less likely to be credit rationed. 
The total assets variable has a negative coefficient, implying a result that is consistent with 
the "pecking order theory." The more assets the entrepreneur has that he can easily liquidate, the 
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more likely that such an entrepreneur will not seek external funds but utilize internal resources 
to operate the enterprise. This reasoning follows the "pecking order theory" [Cuevas (1992), 
Myers (1985)] wherein a firm chooses from a hierarchy of preferences in deciding on the source 
of financing to utilize. This choice is based on the "safety first principle" with internal funds 
being the safest (i.e., defmed as not potentially losing control over the firm) among the choices. 
The result obtained empirically validates this proposition. 
The positive coefficient of number of years in school, a proxy variable for education, im-
plies that more educated entrepreneurs are perceived to be more productive, and hence, are more 
creditworthy and able to borrow than those with less education. This result is consistent with the 
results obtained from other empirical studies [e.g., Sial and Carter (1992) in India, Baydas et al. 
(1992) in Ecuador, and Feder et al. (1990) in China]. It was found that lenders to microenter-
prises in Ecuador are more likely to grant loans to better educated entrepreneurs. Similarly, better 
educated farmers in China are less likely to be credit constrained through institutional sources 
[Feder et al. (1990)]. 
The dummy variable results show that enterprises in lloilo are more likely to obtain loans, 
while female entrepreneurs and enterprises engaged in trading are less likely to be borrowers. 
The joint hypothesis that all the coefficients of the probit equation are zero is rejected at the one 
percent level. 5 
5.2. Results of the output supply equation estimation 
Two variants of the output supply equation are estimated: the full switching model (equa-
tion 8), and the restricted model (equation 9). The difference between the full and the restricted 
model is that the latter assumes there are no added returns to observable and unobservable 
characteristics of the enterprise and the entrepreneur from the use of credit, i.e., the o and (Pc-
pJ parameters are equal to zero. 
The full switching regression estimates show that borrowers do not obtain differential 
returns from observable characteristics as shown by their estimated o values, none of which are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level (see Table 4). It was also impossible to reject the 
hypothesis that aside from the direct effect of the loan, borrowers experience no additional returns 
to their unobservable endowments and attributes, i.e., the estimated coefficient representing (Pc-
Pn) is not significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. The restricted equation was 
estimated therefore to reflect these restrictions in the full switching model. This estimated output 
supply equation has an adjusted R2 value of 0. 70, implying that the estimated equation explains 
70 percent of the variations in the value of output. The subsequent discussion uses the estimates 
of this restricted equation. 
5 The computed value of -2(Log likelihood ratio) is -202.49 and this is greater than the one 
percent critical value of x2 (15 degrees of freedom). 
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Except for firm age, household size, trading (dummy), Iloilo (provincial dummy), and 
experience (dummy) variables, all the other variables in the output supply equation are statistical-
ly significant at the one to 10 percent level and have the expected signs (see Table 4). The positive 
coefficient of number of family labor implies that the more family members work in the enter-
prise, the more labor can be utilized to produce more output. Family labor is particularly 
important in the early stages of enterprise development when there are limited funds to enable the 
operator to hire additional labor. The marginal contribution of family labor during these times, 
therefore, is relatively high. The positive coefficient of the number of hired workers implies that 
as the enterprise increases in size in terms of number of workers, output will also increase. The 
positive coefficient of the value of total assets implies that the more assets the enterprise has, the 
more resources are available for its production. Moreover, if total assets consist of fixed assets 
like equipment, the stronger the positive effect on output. 
Working capital also has a positive coefficient, implying that the more working capital 
available to finance current operations, the more inputs can be used to produce a higher level of 
output. Higher levels of working capital imply less fmancial constraints on the enterprise. Cost 
per hour of labor is also positively related to output. This implies that the hourly cost of labor 
is positively related with enterprise output. This is consistent with the results of many other 
studies [see Mellow (1982), Barron et al. (1987), Brown and Medoff (1989), Idson and Feaster 
(1990), and Kraybill et al. (1991), for example]. This fmding can be explained by: (1) the 
"efficiency wage" hypothesis whereby firms pay a premium for highly disciplined workers, and 
relatively larger firms, i.e., those with larger output may be more accustomed to doing this than 
small flrms; or by (2) economies of scale that allow relatively larger firms to pay their workers 
more. The average number of hours the enterprise operates can be considered a proxy for 
motivation and learning [Variyam and Kraybill (1994), Dunkelberg and Cooper (1990)]. The 
positive coefficient implies that the longer the enterprise operates, the greater the opportunity to 
learn, become more productive, and generate more output. 
The loan variable also has a positive coefficient. As discussed above, borrowed funds can 
affect output by allowing the entrepreneur to use more optimal levels of inputs, newer technology, 
and more intense input use. Additional funds from loans help the entrepreneur overcome fmancial 
constraints on the purchase and allocation of optimal inputs, thereby allowing the entrepreneur 
to enhance allocative efficiency and increase output. 
Among the provincial dummies, Cebu and Bohol have statistically significant coefficients. 
The positive coefficient of the Cebu dummy variable indicates that enterprises operating in Cebu 
have larger output relative to, say, Negros Occidental. This implies that the prevailing market 
conditions and opportunities in Cebu are more favorable to rural nonfarm enterprises relative to 
the other survey areas. On the other hand, the negative coefficient ofBohol suggests the opposite, 
i.e., that the output of rural nonfarm enterprises in Bohol are negatively affected by the environ-
ment in which they operate. This is consistent with Bohol being the least developed in terms of 
infrastructure and markets, despite its closeness to rapidly growing Cebu. Bohol has not taken 
advantage of the market opportunities presented by the economic boom in Cebu. One major fac-
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tor could be the limited infrastructure in the province of Bohol that hinders easy access to other 
markets within and outside the province. 
5.3. Estimates of the credit effect measures 
Table 5 reports the estimates for the measures of credit effect. The random credit effect 
(equation lOa) is estimated to be 0.23 and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This 
implies an increase of 23 percent in output due to borrowing for an average entrepreneur who has 
obtained a loan. The anticipated output of a self-selecting borrower is also estimated to be 23 per-
cent larger than if he or she were in the counterfactual state of being a nonborrower. 6 
Table 5 also shows that the marginal effect of credit is positive (equation 11). At the mean 
loan size, credit is estimated to have a marginal effect of 1. 73, implying that the marginal output 
effect of one more peso of loan is Pl. 73. This estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. This estimated effect also implies that at the observed mean loan size of no thousand, the 
marginal return to credit is larger than the average cost of credit which is about 35 percent. When 
evaluated at zero loan size, the marginal credit effect is estimated to be 1. 79, implying a potential 
increase of more than a peso in output for every peso of loan. This estimate also indicates a 79 
percent shadow price of credit, suggesting a potentially high return to loans to rural nonfarm 
entrepreneurs. The transaction costs involved in getting and repaying a loan may reduce the 
marginal credit effect by an unmeasured amount. 7 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
The descriptive statistical analysis of characteristics between borrowers and nonborrowers 
and rural nonfarm enterprises in the Visayas region showed that borrowers have a larger output 
and net income than nonborrowers. This observed differential performance in favor of borrowers 
can lead one to attribute the difference solely to the effect of credit use. But is this really the case 
among rural nonfarm enterprises? 
This paper utilizes an econometric model that allows for the separation of the true credit 
effects from the effects of observable and unobservable attributes of borrowers and nonborrowers. 
Under such a framework, the different components that underlie the performance gap between 
borrowers and nonborrowers are identified. The results of the econometric estimates indicate that 
6 The random credit effect and the counterfactual effect are equal under the restricted specification 
of the model. 
7 A study by Untalan and Cuevas (1988) estimated that loan processing and loan recovery costs 
account for about 30 and 41 percent, respectively, of total lending costs by banks operating 
outside of Metro Manila. The banks included in the study were commercial bank branches, 
private development banks, and rural banks. 
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an average entrepreneur/enterprise would expect a 23 percent increase in output when obtaining 
the observed average loan size. The econometric estimates do not support the hypothesis that 
latent attributes of borrowers and nonborrowers explain a large part of the observed difference 
in performance. Moreover, the hypothesis that credit only has direct productivity effects and does 
not enhance returns to latent or observable attributes cannot be rejected as well. The anticipated 
output of a self-selecting borrower is also estimated to be 23 percent larger than output in the 
counterfactual state of nonborrowing. These results suggest that the posited positive relationship 
between credit and output has a strong empirical basis and that the pure credit effect is not 
negligible. Hence, there appears to be potential for a positive impact of credit expansion for rural 
nonfarm enterprises in the Visayas region. 
Estimates of the marginal effect of credit indicate a positive marginal impact of borrowing 
on output. The estimated marginal return to loans at the observed average loan size is larger than 
the average rate of interest charged in the rural credit market. This implies that rural nonfarm 
entrepreneurs are potentially capable of paying market rates of interest. Since transactions costs 
were not accounted for in the estimates, however, it cannot be precisely ascertained what the net 
return will be. Data on borrowing transaction costs were not obtained in the survey, so it was not 
possible to adjust the estimates to include these costs. 
An estimate of the shadow price of capital also suggests that an entrepreneur selected at 
random will realize a marginal increase of Pl. 79 in output for a peso of loan, implying that rural 
nonfarm entrepreneurs are credit constrained. Thus, it appears that it is not just the nonborrowers 
who are credit constrained, but also borrowers as well. This suggests the prevalence of inefficient 
rural credit markets in the Visayas region which leaves many of these entrepreneurs credit 
rationed. While borrowers are able to partly solve their frnancial constraints by successfully 
obtaining loans from the credit market, they may still be credit rationed by receiving less than 
their loan demand, i.e., loan size rationed. This opens the issue of whether the informal credit 
market which is largely the main source of finance for these rural nonfarm entrepreneurs can 
efficiently and effectively meet the entrepreneurial credit demand, or whether the long-term 
optimal solution requires formal financial institutions to develop innovative ways of servicing the 
demand for fmance by these entrepreneurs. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of borrowers and nonborrowers 
Mean values Borrower Nonborrower t-value 
n=217 n=183 
Gross sales 856,161 313,791 -2.1928*" 
(3,541,775) (785,416) 
Net income 107,541 65,627 -2.7305* 
(194,159) (106,433) 
Total assets 470,622 283,555 -2.1311"" 
(990,799) (762,978) 
Land (in peso value) 24,163 12,052 -2.0884 .. 
(77,399) (30,303) 
Personal assets 291,611 168,203 -2.8372** 
(559,656) (286,486) 
Number of workers at the start 4.7 3.2 -2.4578** 
(8.3) (3.4) 
Number of workers currently 5.8 4.2 -1.930 ... 
(8.8) (7.5) 
Number of hired workers at start 3.0 1.6 -2 24** 
(8.3) (3.3) 
Number of hired workers currently 3.9 2.4 -1.93"*" 
(8.8) (6.8) 
Hourly wage rate 7.16 4.55 -4.8091* 
(6.57) (4.12) 
Number of months operated in 1991 11.8 11.4 -2.5968" 
(0.8) (1.9) 
Number of hours operated in 1991 9.1 8.6 -2.3427** 
(2.25) (2.0) 
Number of hours workers worked 8.9 8.5 -1.6629"** 
per day in 1991 (2.2) (2.1) 
Income reinvested in the enterprise 48,843 24,774 -2.7064"* 
(114,528) (57,976) 
Income reinvested as working capital 58,138 29,080 -2.8914** 
(128,494) (67,036) 
Note: - significant at 1 percent 
- significant at 5 percent 
- significant at 10 percent 
Figures in parentheses are estimated standard deviation. 
Table 2: List of variables in the empirical model 
THE CREDIT STATUS EQUATION (PROBIT) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 1 IF A BORROWER, 0 OTHERWISE 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES. 
FIXED ASSETS 
TOTAL ASSETS 
FINANCIAL ASSETS 
AGE OF THE ENTERPRISE 
AGE OF THE ENTREPRENEUR 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE 
NO. OF YEARS IN SCHOOL 
PREVIOUS YEAR'S INCOME 
GENDER (DUMMY: 1 IF MALE, 0 IF FEMALE) 
BANK ACCOUNT (DUMMY: 1 IF WITH BANK ACCOUNT, 
0 OTHERWISE) 
BOHOL (DUMMY: 1 IF LOCATED IN BOHOL, 0 OTHERWISE) 
ILOILO (DUMMY: 1 IF LOCATED IN ILOILO, 0 OTHERWISE) 
CEBU (DUMMY: 1 IF LOCATED IN CEBU, 0 OTHERWISE) 
MFG (DUMMY: 1 IF MANUFACTURING, 0 OTHERWISE) 
TRADING (DUMMY: 1 IF TRADING, 0 OTHERWISE) 
OUTPUT SUPPLY EQUATION: 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: VALUE OUTPUT 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
NO. OF FAMILY WORKERS 
NO. OF HIRED WORKERS 
TOTAL ASSETS 
WORKING CAPITAL 
COST PER HOUR OF LABOR 
AGE OF THE ENTERPRISE 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE 
AVE. NO. OF HOURS OPERATED 
LOAN AMOUNT 
LOAN AMOUNT SQUARED 
EXPERIENCE (DUMMY: 1 IF WITH EXPERIENCE, 0 OTHERWISE) 
PROVINCE AND ACTIVITY DUMMIES (SAME AS IN PROBIT EQUATION) 
PDF (Probability density function or <j>(C) in the model) 
INTERACTION TERMS OF VARIABLES AND CDF (Cumulative density function or cl>(C) 
in the model) 
Table 3: Estimated coefficients of the probit equation 
Variable 
Constant 
Fixed assets 
Total assets 
Financial assets 
Age of the enterprise 
Age of the entrepreneur 
Household size 
No. of years in school 
Previous year's income 
Gender (dummy) 
Bank account (dummy) 
Bohol (dummy) 
Iloilo (dummy) 
Cebu (dummy) 
Manufacturing (dummy) 
Trading (dummy) 
Log likelihood ratio 
Percent correctly predicted 
Note: * 
** 
*** 
Significant at 1 percent. 
Significant at 5 percent. 
Significant at 10 percent. 
Coefficient 
-0.3027789 
0.25785266 
-0.9171156 
0.26871197 
0.00271617 
0.09070919 
-0.1012642 
0.16475565 
-0.0798151 
0.3449918 
0.14875312 
0.21549624 
0.57348225 
0.1392916 
-0.3086151 
-0.8865755 
Chi-square value 
1.803943 
1.555336 
7.551057* 
5.047989** 
0.001063 
1.078551 
1.814128 
3.191481*** 
0.853162 
4.931064** 
0.808113 
0.738952 
6.878012* 
0.411719 
2.315414 
22.89473* 
-202.4874475 
84.00 
Table 4: Estimated coefficients of the endogenous switching regression model 
Endogenous Swnchmg Regression 
Variable OLS Full Switching Model 
All Borrower Restricted Model 
Differential 
Constant 4.738543 -1.295507 9.251535 4.360621 
(8.041)" (-0.510) (2.364) .. (6.829)" 
No. of family 0.242519 -0.017823 0.666508 0.273229 
workers (2.876)* ( -0.073) (1.352) (2.800)"" 
No. of hired 0.231969 -0.180227 0.885918 0.167336 
workers (3.494)" (-1.018) (2.303)** (2.269)*" 
Total assets 0.093367 0.290907 -0.281013 0.145180 
(2.636)" {2.560)* (-1.340) (3.675)* 
Working capital 0.408793 0.526370 -0.312765 0.394831 
(13.89)' (6.073)" (-1.692)*"' (12.298)* 
Cost per hour of 0.116205 0.412604 -0.681619 0.137971 
labor (pesolhr) (2.189)'" (2.574)" (-2.002)'' (2.391)"* 
Age of enterprise 0.085102 0.176075 -0.248552 0.074787 
{1.877)'** (1.311) (-0.902) (1.369) 
Household size -0.028935 -0.044101 0.208046 -0.012624 
(-0.346) (-0.188) (0.427) (-0.137) 
Ave. no. of hours 0.386424 0.884029 -1.002134 0.344517 
operated (2.072) .. (1.531) ( -0.891) (1. 713)*"* 
Mfg. (dummy) -0.277187 0.258388 -0.882149 -0.255514 
(-2.402) .. (0.437) (-0.852) (-2.037) .. 
Trdg. (dummy) -0.053948 0.334885 -0.315130 -0.023815 
( -0.476) (0.512) (-0.216) (-0.191) 
Bohol (dummy) -0.637754 -0.763465 0.270541 -0.596292 
(-4.154)" (-1.888)"** (0.285) (-3.631)" 
Iloilo (dummy) -0.134032 -0.312807 0.148047 -0.109236 
(-1.093) (-0.656) (0.141) (-0.816) 
Cebu (dummy) 0.469132 0.594503 -0.476475 0.468399 
(4.245)* (1.884)'** (-0.607) (3.669)' 
Experience 0.160606 0.112733 0.128780 0.147340 
(dummy) (1.831)''* (0.475) (0.257) (1.513) 
Loans 0.000011640 0.00001087 0.000011758 
(3.212)' (2.213)'* (2.448)'* 
Loans2 -3.88123x10-12 -1.04995xl0·11 -1.11392x10-11 
(-1.907)*** (-1.263) (-1.366) 
Pdf 2.685880 
(1.358) 
Adi. R2 0.72 0.70 0.70 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
* Significant at 1 percent. 
** Significant at 5 percent. 
*** Significant at 10 percent. 
Table 5: Estimated values of credit effects 
Credit Effect Estimated value 
Gross output supply gap 0.23053 
(at mean loan size) (0.000003)* 
Random credit effect 0.23079 
(at mean loan size) (0.000004)" 
Marginal credit effect 1.7329 
(at mean loan size) (0.3242)* 
Marginal credit effect 1.7940 
(at zero loan size) (0.3357)* 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Under the restricted switching regression 
specification, random credit effect is equal to the counterfactual effect. 
* Significant at 1 percent. 
Source of Data: Table 4. 
Sampling Design for the Study of Rural Nonfarm Enterprises 
The sampling design for the study of rural nonfarm enterprises is two-stage random 
sampling within the primary sampling units (PSUs). The sampling frame used was the list of 
establishments that the National Statistics Office uses in the Annual Survey of Establishments. 
This list includes establishments with a fixed location. Hence, itinerant vendors and 
enterprises with no fixed place of operation are not included in the sampling frame. 
The rural areas of the provinces of Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Cebu, and Bohol are the 
principal domains of the survey. These include all areas except the cities of Iloilo, Bacolod, 
Bago, Cadiz, La Carlota, San Carlos, Silay, Cebu, Danao, Lapu-lapu, Mandaue, Toledo, and 
Tagbilaran. 
The municipalities are the PSUs while the barangays are the secondary sampling units 
(SSUs). Within each domain, a predetermined number of PSUs are chosen (i. e., two PSUs 
each for Iloilo and Negros Occidental and three PSUs each for Cebu and Bohol). These PSUs 
are selected as follows: 
o Within each province, list all the municipalities and rank them according to the 
number of nonfarm establishments in each municipality from biggest to 
smallest. Exclude from the list those municipalities that have peace and order 
problems (based on report obtained from the regional offices of the National 
Economic and Development Authority during the ocular inspection of the 
survey area), as well as municipalities that have enterprises engaged in only one 
or two types of nonfarm activities. 
o Select the PSUs from each province randomly with probability proportional to 
the number of establishments. 
Within each PSU, barangays are chosen randomly with probability proportional to the 
number of enterprises in each barangay. For the first barangay to be randomly picked, the 
number of establishments in that barangay are evaluated. If the number of establishments in, 
say, barangay 1 is less than the total number of targeted sample establishments for the 
municipality, then all of these establishments are included in the sample establishments for the 
municipality. Then another barangay is randomly picked from among the barangays in that 
particular municipality and the same process is continued until such time that the required 
number of establishments for the municipality is met. If the number of establishments for the 
last barangay to be randomly picked is greater than the required sample, then the sample 
establishments from that barangay are selected using systematic random sampling. 
Taking into account cost considerations, the decision reached is for a sample of 400 
enterprises distributed as follows: 
Iloilo 100 
Negros Occidental 100 
Cebu 150 
Bohol 50 
This sample size is fairly substantial to provide adequate statistics for the various statistical 
analyses to be undertaken. 
